NTLMv1 and MS-CHAPv2: audit VPN and Wi-Fi dependencies

Correlate events 4033, 4024 and 4025, verify Credential Guard, and plan a BlockNtlmv1SSO pilot followed by migration to EAP-TLS.

01

A working VPN may still depend on legacy credentials

The goal is to identify network access that reuses Windows sign-in credentials through MS-CHAPv2, then remove that dependency without stranding remote staff. An event labelled NTLMv1 deserves investigation; it does not describe the entire VPN or Wi-Fi authentication path.

This is a focused diagnostic guide, not a complete identity or network assessment. ATELIER-DC01, ATELIER-NPS01 and the pilot account are fictional. Social-media screenshots are investigation leads, not authoritative configuration evidence.

02

Separate NTLM, MS-CHAPv2, PEAP, and SSO

TermMeaningOperational implication
NTLMv1 / NTLMv2Versions of NTLM; v2 does not turn MS-CHAPv2 into modern authentication.Separate NTLM policy from the EAP method in a network profile.
MS-CHAPv2Password-based authentication with NTLMv1-derived cryptography.Inventory VPN, wireless and wired profiles that request it.
PEAPA TLS wrapper around an inner method, including MS-CHAPv2 or EAP-TLS.Read the inner method; PEAP alone does not prove client certificate authentication.
SSOReusing signed-in credentials without entering them again.Test SSO separately from explicitly supplied credentials. A successful prompt does not prove working SSO.
03

Versions and timing: auditing is not enforcement

KB5066470 covers Windows 11 24H2 and subsequent versions listed in its scope, plus Server 2025. With Credential Guard disabled and no explicit value, October 13, 2026 updates change BlockNtlmv1SSO from audit to enforcement. The registry value remains absent. The 2025 rollout was gradual; check the installed build.

Enhanced auditing is separate: KB5064479 covers Windows 11 24H2 onward, Server 2025, and Server 2019/2022 with October 13, 2026 updates (KB5126651/KB5126655 or successors). Their ability to log events does not establish support for the client enforcement setting.

04

1. Inventory hosts and use delegated read access

Select an affected client, every NPS/RRAS in its path, and the DCs that might process the request. Record VPN client version, profile, inner EAP method, user versus machine authentication, and business owner. Compare with an unaffected device using the same profile.

The following commands read local configuration. Use delegated log and registry access; Security log access and some CIM queries may require elevation depending on ACLs. Do not assign Domain Admin for collection. Access denied is a collection limitation, not evidence of a healthy system.

Get-HotFix does not cover every servicing mechanism. Match build and UBR against the official update history for that Windows release. These reads require no paid Microsoft 365 module; separately check Credential Guard edition eligibility and SIEM costs.

PowerShell — read-only operating system inventory
# Read-only / Lecture seule: local OS build and installed hotfix inventory
Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem |
  Select-Object Caption, Version, BuildNumber, LastBootUpTime
Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion' |
  Select-Object DisplayVersion, CurrentBuildNumber, UBR
Get-HotFix | Sort-Object InstalledOn -Descending |
  Select-Object -First 12 HotFixID, InstalledOn
05

2. Read the setting and verify Credential Guard is running

The setting is REG_DWORD BlockNtlmv1SSO under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0: 0 audits, 1 enforces. It controls the machine generating SSO credentials, not a universal DC validation rule. Changing it requires no device restart.

Confirm whether an empty result means the value is absent; do not silently treat it as zero. In Win32_DeviceGuard, 1 in SecurityServicesRunning means Credential Guard is running. SecurityServicesConfigured alone is insufficient, and a CIM error proves neither state.

Credential Guard restricts MS-CHAP and NTLMv1 SSO, while explicitly supplied credentials may still work. Check actual state, method and credential source. A successful connection does not establish every DC policy.

PowerShell — local state without changes
# Read-only / Lecture seule: preserve absence as a distinct state
$key = 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0'
$item = Get-ItemProperty -Path $key -ErrorAction Stop
$item | Select-Object BlockNtlmv1SSO
Get-CimInstance -Namespace root\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceGuard `
  -ClassName Win32_DeviceGuard |
  Select-Object SecurityServicesConfigured, SecurityServicesRunning
06

3. Collect events without overinterpreting them

In NTLM/Operational, 4024 records an audited SSO attempt and 4025 a blocked attempt. DC events 4032/4033 describe forwarded authentication; 4033 is a security warning, not an exclusive MS-CHAPv2 fingerprint. Include 4030/4031 for cross-domain paths.

LmCompatibilityLevel=5 alone is not proof that every MS-CHAPv2 path is rejected: validate the NPS/RRAS path and its actual results. Client Machine NULL does not identify the endpoint. Missing MIC, Service Binding or Flags values do not establish the authentication method on their own. Preserve original XML when parsing named fields: rendered messages are localized and schemas can evolve.

The 2,000-event limit can hide older results; split busy periods into smaller time windows. No matches may indicate disabled logging, overwritten records, the wrong DC or a short observation window. Distinguish all of these from denied access.

PowerShell — channel configuration and recent events
# Read-only / Lecture seule: run locally on each selected machine
$log = 'Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational'
Get-WinEvent -ListLog $log -ErrorAction Stop |
  Select-Object LogName, IsEnabled, RecordCount, MaximumSizeInBytes, LogMode
# Bounded time window; MaxEvents can truncate results / Peut tronquer les résultats
$start = (Get-Date).AddHours(-4)
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName=$log; Id=4024,4025,4030,4031,4032,4033; StartTime=$start} `
  -MaxEvents 2000 -ErrorAction Stop |
  Select-Object TimeCreated, MachineName, Id, RecordId, Message
07

4. Correlate DC, NPS/RRAS, and endpoint evidence

On NPS, 6272 records granted access and 6273 denied access. Read the reason code, policy, EAP method and available attributes; denial does not automatically mean NTLMv1. Availability depends on NPS audit policy.

For a controlled test, make one connection using the pilot account and note UTC time. Link the NPS result to the intermediary seen by the DC, then to VPN/RRAS and endpoint logs. Use available session identifiers or station attributes. A shared NAT address or account name alone is not reliable attribution.

Check clock alignment first. RADIUS proxies and third-party VPNs can change the available fields. Consult their logs without assuming Client Machine always names the laptop. Keep both successes and failures to reveal alternate paths.

PowerShell — read NPS events
# Read-only / Lecture seule: on the NPS server, with delegated log access
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
  LogName='Security'; Id=6272,6273; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddHours(-4)
} -MaxEvents 1000 -ErrorAction Stop |
  Select-Object TimeCreated, MachineName, Id, RecordId, Message
08

5. Inspect profiles without exporting secrets

These commands cover the built-in Windows VPN client, not every third-party agent. An empty list therefore does not prove that no VPN exists. For wireless access, inspect the GPO or MDM profile next: inner method, server certificate validation, trusted authorities and expected server names.

Do not export clear-text Wi-Fi keys or RADIUS shared secrets. Avoid posting raw logs in public support tickets: they may expose account names, addresses and infrastructure details. Store evidence in a restricted location with an agreed retention period.

PowerShell and netsh — profile inventory
# Read-only / Lecture seule: built-in Windows VPN profiles, current user
Get-VpnConnection |
  Select-Object Name, TunnelType, AuthenticationMethod, UseWinlogonCredential
# All-user profiles / Profils tous utilisateurs
Get-VpnConnection -AllUserConnection |
  Select-Object Name, TunnelType, AuthenticationMethod, UseWinlogonCredential
# Wi-Fi profile names only; never export clear-text keys
netsh wlan show profiles
09

6. Size and centralize logs using measured volume

Measure events per hour and average record size during representative days, then allow for the maximum collector outage and a margin. Read MaximumSizeInBytes and LogMode on each role; do not assume a universal 1 MB default.

WEF does not itself enable channels or configure their size. Prepare ACLs and policies separately, verify receipt of a known event and monitor delivery delay. A new subscription does not necessarily retrieve the historical window you need by default; preserve local evidence before rotation.

An operational recommendation is to retain XML, host, RecordId and timestamp, restrict access to assigned analysts, and validate SIEM volume and cost. Collection that loses evidence during outages cannot justify declaring a dependency removed.

10

7. Pilot enforcement and plan a temporary exception

Before changing anything, arrange recovery access independent of the VPN under test, record the original value or absence, and check whether GPO or MDM will reapply a setting. Select representative devices with owners and a support window. The following change is for one approved pilot client.

Test a new SSO connection, explicit credentials separately, an authorized account and a deliberately unauthorized test account. Verify resource access, reconnection after sleep, pre-logon access where required, and client/NPS evidence. An already established tunnel does not validate the new policy.

For a confirmed critical failure, an approved exception may temporarily set 0 on those clients only, with an owner and expiry. This reduces protection and does not override Credential Guard. Restore the prior value afterward, or remove only this value if originally absent; on a current build, absence restores enforcement. Do not globally disable Credential Guard or lower DC LmCompatibilityLevel.

CHANGE — enforcement on one pilot client, local administrator
# CHANGE / CHANGEMENT: approved pilot client only, elevated PowerShell
# Record previous absence/value in the change ticket before running.
$key = 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0'
New-ItemProperty -Path $key -Name BlockNtlmv1SSO `
  -PropertyType DWord -Value 1 -Force -ErrorAction Stop
# Read back; then test a NEW connection / Relire puis tester une NOUVELLE connexion
Get-ItemProperty -Path $key -Name BlockNtlmv1SSO
11

8. Migrate to EAP-TLS and prove the outcome

EAP-TLS or PEAP-TLS can replace password dependencies when the actual client, VPN, wireless and RADIUS products support the method. Prepare client and server certificates, appropriate authentication usages, trusted chains, server names, renewal and revocation access. Verify certificate mapping to the authorized identity.

Do not disable server certificate validation to make the pilot succeed. In a controlled lab, test a valid certificate, an expired or revoked certificate, and an identity without network authorization. Plan renewal for remote devices that cannot reach provisioning infrastructure before authentication.

A useful deliverable is a per-profile matrix: owner, devices, method, correlated evidence, confirmed or uncertain dependency, target, test outcome and exception removal date. A few quiet hours do not validate infrequently connected devices. Active Directory and network consulting can help coordinate migration across responsible teams.