A working boot does not prove the migration is complete
“Secure Boot enabled” answers one question: is verification active? It does not prove that the 2023 certificate authorities and the expected boot manager have been deployed. A useful assessment separates enablement, migration progress, and operation after a change.
This guide provides a local verification workflow and a deployment pilot. Collection commands change neither firmware nor BitLocker. They are not a complete endpoint or boot-chain security assessment.
Understand the 2026 transition
The 2011 certificates have different expiration dates: June 24, 2026 for KEK, June 27 for the third-party UEFI authority, and October 19 for Windows Production PCA. Their replacements separate trust for Windows, third-party loaders, and Option ROMs. Expiration does not mean every computer suddenly stops booting; it affects delivery of new early-boot protections.
| Component | Verification role |
|---|---|
| DB | Trusted authorities, including Windows UEFI CA 2023. |
| KEK | Authorizes signature database updates. |
| DBX | Revocations: adding trust and removing trust are different operations. |
| Boot manager | Must also match the expected transition. |
Collect an actionable inventory
Use elevated Windows PowerShell on an authorized device. Local collection does not require Domain Admin membership; do not distribute a highly privileged account across the fleet. For central execution, use your approved management platform and scoped permissions.
Group results by model, BIOS/UEFI version, and full Windows build. Check each edition’s support lifecycle and applicable updates: older releases may require ESU coverage or migration. Intune and other management services retain their own licensing requirements; these local commands do not require an Intune subscription.
True confirms enablement; False means disabled on a supported platform. An exception can mean insufficient privileges or an unsupported legacy BIOS platform. Record it as unknown, never compliant. UBR helps match the cumulative update to its applicable bulletin.
# Read-only local inventory; elevated Windows PowerShell.
Get-CimInstance Win32_ComputerSystem | Select-Object Manufacturer, Model
Get-CimInstance Win32_BIOS | Select-Object SMBIOSBIOSVersion, ReleaseDate
Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem |
Select-Object Caption, Version, BuildNumber, LastBootUpTime
Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion' |
Select-Object DisplayVersion, CurrentBuild, UBR
try {
[pscustomobject]@{SecureBootEnabled = (Confirm-SecureBootUEFI -ErrorAction Stop)}
} catch {
Write-Warning ('Secure Boot status UNKNOWN: ' + $_.Exception.Message)
}Read progress without editing the registry
The detailed registry documentation places UEFICA2023Status under SecureBoot\Servicing. NotStarted, InProgress, and Updated describe progress. A nonzero error needs investigation. Microsoft advises against using WindowsUEFICA2023Capable as a general success indicator.
Keep raw values and collection time. Missing values do not prove current firmware. A scheduled task’s existence does not prove completion. Compare these signals with a validated device of the same model and the servicing prerequisites.
# Read-only. Missing properties remain unknown, not compliant.
$root = 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot'
foreach ($path in @($root, "$root\Servicing")) {
if (Test-Path $path) {
Get-ItemProperty $path |
Select-Object PSPath, AvailableUpdates, UEFICA2023Status,
UEFICA2023Error, UEFICA2023ErrorEvent
} else { Write-Warning "Missing registry path: $path" }
}
Get-ScheduledTask -TaskPath '\Microsoft\Windows\PI\' -TaskName 'Secure-Boot-Update' |
Select-Object TaskName, StateCorrelate events 1801, 1795, and 1808
Review the System log, TPM-WMI provider, and chronology. An old failure may precede success; missing events may have been overwritten. KB5016061 covers multiple Windows and Windows Server releases, and event availability also depends on installed updates.
| Event | Meaning / next check |
|---|---|
| 1801 | Incomplete migration; inspect details and current state. |
| 1795 | Firmware returned an error; retain its code and component. |
| 1800 | Restart required; schedule it in the change window. |
| 1803 | Required signed KEK unavailable; check OEM support. |
| 1808 | Required certificates and the 2023-signed boot manager applied. |
| 1032 | BitLocker incompatibility detected; follow targeted Microsoft guidance. |
# Read-only: recent evidence, not a full historical inventory.
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'System'
ProviderName = 'Microsoft-Windows-TPM-WMI'
Id = 1032,1795,1800,1801,1803,1808
StartTime = (Get-Date).AddDays(-30)
} -ErrorAction Stop |
Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending |
Select-Object TimeCreated, Id, LevelDisplayName, MessagePrepare recovery before the pilot
Confirm an authorized person can actually retrieve each pilot device’s BitLocker recovery key from another device. Do not copy recovery keys into inventory reports, shared tickets, or screenshots. ProtectionStatus does not prove escrow to Entra ID or AD DS.
The command below displays only volume status. If the module is missing, use the procedure for your Windows edition; do not interpret failure as absence of encryption. Also prepare controlled local administrator access and physical access or a suitable remote console.
# Read-only; does not display recovery passwords or key protectors.
Get-BitLockerVolume -MountPoint $env:SystemDrive |
Select-Object MountPoint, VolumeStatus, ProtectionStatus, EncryptionPercentageChanges: pilot each hardware family
Fictional example: for 120 computers across four models, select a few representative devices per model/firmware combination, including a BitLocker laptop and a device using your recovery media. Include relevant variants such as docks, PXE, dual boot, or specialist hardware. Testing only recent devices leaves gaps.
Install applicable Windows updates and OEM-recommended firmware following their prerequisites. Validate that stage before continuing. For VMs, check the hypervisor and virtual firmware too; the state of a new VM does not necessarily describe an existing VM.
Then use the supported Microsoft deployment method for that group. The registry procedure documents AvailableUpdates as REG_DWORD 0x5944 under SecureBoot and the Secure-Boot-Update task. This is a change, not an inventory command: follow the official sequence, restarts, and completion criteria. Do not repeatedly overwrite that value with a compliance script.
Evaluate the result rather than the initial requested value. Some operations depend on existing trust. Do not force third-party authorities onto every model simply to make all databases identical.
Validate results and track exceptions
After planned restarts, collect state and events again. Look for Updated and consistent recent confirmation such as 1808, then confirm Secure Boot remains enabled and BitLocker protected. Test sign-in, essential applications, and approved recovery media. Track devices lacking sufficient evidence separately.
For example, PC-LAB-01 reports Updated with a recent 1808 and boots correctly; PC-LAB-02 reports InProgress with 1795; PC-LAB-03 has no telemetry. The second needs firmware investigation; the third needs a collection check. These are different outcomes.
Maintain a device/model/build/firmware/status/latest event/owner/action table. Restrict inventory access and collect only necessary information. Weekly collection during the campaign can reveal persistent exceptions without exposing secrets.
Recovery planning is not a promise of rollback
If a problem occurs, stop expanding the pilot and retain logs. A registry backup or disk snapshot does not guarantee reversal of UEFI variable changes. Do not blindly remove 2023 certificates or restore factory keys: the installed boot manager might no longer be trusted.
Use the Microsoft/OEM procedure for the observed symptom, with compatible recovery media and available BitLocker keys. Consider temporary BitLocker suspension only when required by the applicable update or manufacturer procedure, and verify protection resumes. Disabling Secure Boot across the fleet is not a fix.
For mixed hardware or critical servers, infrastructure and cybersecurity consulting can help organize inventory, deployment waves, and recovery tests. This guide prepares that work; it does not replace validation of your hardware and dependencies.